State aid to investment and R&D /
The prohibition of state aid to investment and R&D in an integrated market such as the European Community is analysed in a Cournot oligopoly model where firms undertake investment or R&D to reduce their costs. Both strategic and non-strategic investment and R&D are considered. Government...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Collie, David R. |
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| Corporate συγγραφέας: | European Commission : Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. |
| Μορφή: | Βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | Greek English |
| Στοιχεία έκδοσης: |
Brussels- Belgium:
European Comission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
2005.
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| Σειρά: |
European Economy. Economic papers ;
231. |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary622_en.htm |
| Ετικέτες: |
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| Περίληψη: |
The prohibition of state aid to investment and R&D in an integrated market such as the European Community is analysed in a Cournot oligopoly model where firms undertake investment or R&D to reduce their costs. Both strategic and non-strategic investment and R&D are considered. Governments in the Member States give subsidies for investment and R&D, which are financed by distortionary taxation so the opportunity cost of government revenue exceeds unity. • Prohibiting state aid to investment will always increase aggregate welfare. • Prohibiting state aid to R&D will always increase aggregate welfare if spillovers from R&D are small. • If spillovers from R&D are moderate then there exists a range of values for opportunity cost where governments give state aid and where the prohibition of state aid will increase aggregate welfare. • Prohibiting state aid to R&D will reduce aggregate welfare if spillovers from R&D are large. |
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| Φυσική περιγραφή: |
14 σ.: πιν. 30 εκ. |
| ISBN: |
92-894-8870-0 |
| ISSN: |
1016-8060 (print) 1725-3187 (online) |
| Σχετικά τεκμήρια: |
Economic Papers |